Abstract-This paper addresses the problem of flexible procurement of multiple services with multiple non-functional characteristics, i.e., quality of service attributes. We consider the one-to-many negotiation approach as a flexible method for procuring multiple services by a buyer agent. We address the problem of coordinating multiple concurrent negotiations and propose a novel dynamic negotiation strategy that considers the behaviors of the opponents of the current negotiation encounter in managing the local reservation values of the common negotiation issues (attributes) of different services. Most previous works consider the problem of negotiation over a single issue. We investigate a more complex situation where a buyer agent negotiates over multiple services given that each service has multiple negotiation issues. The experimental results show an evidence for the effectiveness and robustness of our dynamic negotiation strategy in various negotiation environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quality-of-service (QoS) is the non-functional characteristic of a service (e.g., reliability) which distinguishes between functionally equivalent services. It is the focus of competition between providers of functionally similar services. A competitive criterion in the service oriented domain is the flexibility in the number of possible QoS options that is available for customers to choose from. The current offer-based methods of QoS show either little or no flexibility in the possible number of available options for the combinations of the QoS configurations. The service configuration flexibility problem stems from the fact that in many cases, the possible combination of different attribute values of services are infinite in number. In addition, it is difficult to know the preferences of users.
An advantage of adopting automated negotiation as an approach for provisioning/procuring of services is that, through exchanging of offers and counteroffers, opponents can direct the search for the possible QoS configurations towards their desired needs by explicitly asking for specific values for the attributes of each service. To this end, we investigate the oneto-many negotiation form as a flexible method for service provisioning and procuring.
Automated quality of service negotiation remains an active research area especially in the service oriented computing domain [11] [16] [18] . The one-to-many negotiation form is an alternative mechanism to the single-sided auction protocol that introduces more flexibility for both buyers and sellers in terms of expressing their preferences by exchanging offers and counteroffers [1] [12] [14] . Many possible application domains can be represented by this form of negotiation, such as the supply chain domain, the task allocation and order fulfillment problems, e-commerce etc. [19] . In the cloud computing context, both providers and requesters of resources can use automated negotiation to negotiate resource leasing contracts [1] . In the service oriented domain for example, a service requester can negotiate with multiple service providers concurrently over the service level agreements (SLAs) for the purpose of procuring one or more services [11] .
In this paper we consider the one-to-many negotiation form where a buyer agent seeks to procure multiple distinct services and each service has one provider and multiple issues, i.e., attributes. We extend our work in [9] by investigating the proposed approach under various negotiation environments, defining the proposed algorithms and explaining them by examples.
Procuring more than one service is a daily practice by providers and requesters or sellers and buyers in various business domains. We investigate the situation where a buyer agent negotiates with multiple seller agents concurrently for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements over multiple services (i.e., one agreement per one service.) The multiple agreements can be connected or disconnected. If the buyer agent seeks to have an agreement over all the needed services together then the agreements are connected otherwise the agreements are disconnected, which means the buyer agent negotiates to reach the largest possible number of agreements. Coordination between concurrent negotiations is needed whether the agreements are connected or disconnected.
We propose a dynamic negotiation strategy for multiple services given that each service has multiple issues and a single provider (DNS-MMS, for short DS) that manages multi-bilateral concurrent negotiations. The DS controls the local reservation values of different negotiation issues of different services during negotiation. The control process is triggered by the level of cooperations of opponents in terms of their most recent concessions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating scenario while section 3 discusses the negotiation framework. Section 4 presents the coordination approach. In Section 5, we explain the experimental settings and analyse the results. Section 6 reviews the related work and finally, section 7 concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
II. MOTIVATING SCENARIO We consider a buyer agent negotiates with four different seller agents over four different services (see Table I ) and each service has multiple issues.
Each issue has a unit and a global reservation value which does not change during negotiation (see Table II ). There are infinite possible configurations of different services because the values of the issues are of continuous type. During negotiation, the buyer agent aims to have an agreement over each issue of each service with a value away from its local reservation value and near its initial value (except for the throughput issue) to maximize its utility. III. NEGOTIATION MODEL We consider a buyer agent b negotiates with a set of sellers S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n } concurrently (see Figure 1 .) The buyer agent has a set of delegate negotiators D = {d 1 , d 2 , ..., d n }. Each delegate d i negotiates with a seller s i . The possible negotiation issues over which D and S negotiate are included in the set J = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j g } and each issue j i ∈ J must be an issue of negotiation by at least one negotiation pair, i.e., (d i , s i ). To make our negotiation model more comprehensive, we introduce the notion of negotiation object set (O). The negotiation object is any item over which agents have interest to negotiate over. A negotiation object represents either a physical item (e.g., a printed book) or non physical item, e.g., a service. Let O = {o 1 , o 2 , ..., o m } where m is the number of objects in the current negotiation encounter and each o i ∈ O represents an object of negotiation. The illustration of the idea is shown in Figure 1 .
In our model, each negotiation delegate is mapped (f d ) onto an object, a deadline t max ∈ N * by which time the 
At this point, it is important to differentiate between the global and local reservation values. We assume that the global reservation value is fixed and is provided at the beginning of negotiation for each issue. Each global reservation value of an issue is divided amongst delegates responsible for objects having a common issue as a member of their negotiation issue subsets to be the local reservation values. The local reservation values are assigned at the start of negotiation and can be changed later during negotiation.
In other words, a common issue is an issue that is common between multiple objects (e.g., price).
Other parameters can also be assigned to an issue. In our work, we consider the local reservation value weights (see Table III ) that are used to calculate the local reservation value for each issue of each object. In addition, we use the issue utility weights (see Table IV ) to compute the utility of any agreement given that the issues under negotiation are independent.
As a data structure representation, we propose to use a matrix data structure to represent information related to some negotiation variables. We describe two matrices. The first matrix is the local reservation value weights matrix (W) which stores weights of the common issues that are used to calculate the local reservation value for each common issue in each negotiation round (see Table III ). In each negotiation round, a common negotiation issue may have a new value in the W matrix, hence that matrix is not a static one but rather a dynamic one. The second matrix is the utility weights matrix (W) which stores a weight value for each issue (see Table IV ). The W matrix is static and does not change during negotiation.
The size of any matrix depends on both the size of O and the size of J where the maximum size of any matrix equals |O| × |J|.
We use the notation x t y→z to stand for the vector of values proposed by an agent y to an agent z at time t. To refer to a value of a certain issue say j i , we use the notation
) be the weighted utility of an offer x t y→z for an object o i of agent z, then
Where J i ∈ 2 J stands for the subset of issues related to an object o i . Equation 2 calculates the weighted utility for a counteroffer x t y→z assuming that
For a given W of size (a 1 × a 2 ), then
Equation 3 shows that the sum of the weights in each row in the matrix W equals 1. The sum of the weights in each column is generally not equal to 1. However, the sum of the weights of a column might equal to 1 only by chance and it is irrelevant to the utility calculations.
Equation 4 shows that the sum of the weights in each column in the matrix W equals 1. Again, the sum of the weights of a row might be equal to 1 only by chance and it is irrelevant to the proposed dynamic strategy.
The offers and counteroffers that are exchanged between the negotiation pair (d i , s i ) at time t is called a negotiation thread. Formally, the negotiation thread denoted by X t di↔si is defined as follows [4] :
si→di }, assuming that the seller s i starts offering at time t = 0, the time t is odd and the first element is optionally ∈ {accept,withdraw}. If the time t is even then the first
∈ {accept, withdraw} where first(.) is a function returning the first element is a sequence. In this study, the negotiation objects are services.
IV. COORDINATION APPROACH
During multi-bilateral concurrent negotiation, the buyer agent needs to coordinate its actions against its opponents in each negotiation round to achieve the goal of the negotiation process in terms of reaching valuable agreements. Coordinating the buyer's actions in that context means managing the buyer's negotiation strategy during negotiation.
Formally, let Ω a be the negotiation strategy of an agent a, then Ω a = IV a , RV a , T a , Θ a , where IV a , RV a , T a , Θ a represent the initial offer value, the reservation value, the deadline and the set of offer generation strategy of an agent a respectively. Each strategy component may represent a vector of values in case of multi-object and/or multi-issue negotiation.
Our representation of negotiation strategy Ω is similar to its representation in [6] , the difference is that the fourth part of the strategy in [6] represents the β value of the time-dependent offer generation tactics [4] while the fourth part in our representation (i.e., Θ a ) has a more general meaning: it indicates any possible offer generation method (e.g., trade-off, time-dependent, behavior dependent) and their associated parameters.
Any change to Ω a during negotiation means a change in agent a's negotiation strategy. Our focus in this paper is on the second element of Ω a , i.e., RV a . A change in RV a implies any change in the local reservation values of the common issues. The value of each local reservation value for each common issue depends on the values in the W matrix. The values in the W matrix are changed in each negotiation round according to the behaviors of the current opponents.
The proposed DS is a dynamic negotiation strategy in the sense that it assigns a possibly different local reservation value for each common issue in each negotiation round. The method adjusts the initial local reservation value weights matrix (W) which will be used to assign a possibly different local reservation value for each common issue. The weights are adjusted at each negotiation round depending on the current behaviors or the levels of cooperation of the opponents on each common issue. Opponents can have different preferences over different issues and that is what we utilize in designing our dynamic negotiation strategy.
The initial local reservation value weights (see Table III ) could be assigned according to the initial reservation value for each issue. The initial reservation values are usually obtained from some domain knowledge or knowledge from previous negotiation encounters.
A. Concessions of Opponents
When a buyer agent negotiates over multiple services given that each service has multiple issues, the buyer agent tracks the concessions on the common issues of different services bearing in mind that opponents can have different preferences on issues of different services. For example, considering Table I , a seller agent of service B may concede more on the response time issue than a seller of service C does, which means that the buyer agent should adjust its concessions in a way that gives more concession on the response time issue to the seller agent of service C and less concession on the response time issue to the seller agent of service B.
Shifting the amount of concessions on each common issue means adjusting the value of the proposed counteroffers in a way to enhance the chances of improving the utility rate and/or agreement rate and at the same time it may provide more counteroffer values to the opponents.
At anytime during negotiation, there will be n active negotiation threads, where n is the current number of seller agents. Formally,
The buyer agent uses the information in X t in the decision process of adjusting the weights in the W matrix (see Table  III ) as follows.
Formally, let Δfc 
The ΔF C t i is a vector of the difference between the seller s i first-order differences and the delegate d i first-order differences of concessions on the issues of service o k which we call the relative concessions because it relates between the concessions of a seller agent s i to concessions of a buyer's delegate d i on different issues of object o k .
The following numerical example explains the idea of computing relative concessions.
• Example 1: 
Based on Table V and assuming that the first round starts at time t = 0, we find the following: shows that the most generous seller agent is agent number 3 while the seller agent number 1 is the least generous one etc.
B. The Dynamic Strategy
The proposed dynamic negotiation strategy for multiple services given that each service has multiple issues and a single provider (DNS-MMS, for short DS) is summarized in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1 (DS)

Min Max Swap() 4: end while
In order to adjust the local reservation value weights for the common issues dynamically during negotiation, we need first to group the common issues. There will be a number of groups equal to the number of the common issues. The procedure GroupJ() adds common issue flag that determines whether an issue belongs to a certain service under negotiation.
• Example 2: from Table I, we will have the following groups: throughput = {1, 1, 0, 1}, response time = {0, 1, 1, 1}, reliability = {1, 1, 0, 0}. The position of the flag is important, for example position 3 in any group set refers to service C while position 2 refers to service B etc. The price group has four 1 members since all services have the price issue in their negotiation issue sets, while the reliability group has two 1 members since only services A and B have the reliability as a negotiation issue in their negotiation issue sets etc. Let CI be the output of the algorithm GroupJ(), CI will be used as shown in the algorithm Min Max Swap(). For the example 2, CI = {{1, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 0, 1}, {0, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 0 for all k ∈ CI l do 10:
end if ). In each new iteration, the previous exchanged positions do not change, the algorithm compares between the relative concessions that have not undergone the position exchange process in a previous iteration.
The idea behind exchanging the position of the best conceding opponent with the position of the worst conceding opponent in each iteration of the algorithm swap(.) is to assign high local reservation value weights to the unfavorable seller agents (to guarantee an agreement) and low weights to the favorable seller agents to improve the buyers' utility of an agreement. In other words, the swap(.) algorithm exploits the fact that when the difference between the concessions of two opponents is maximum, then we can exchange our strategy between the two opponents in terms of our concession behavior to increase the chance of reaching a valuable agreement, i.e., an agreement with high utility.
The mechanism of the swap(.) algorithm is explained in example 3.
• Example 3: assume that the set of relative concessions on issue j i is ΔF 0, −3, −1, 2, 4, 1, 6} The above steps are executed on each ΔF t j1 ∈ F t . The next step is to normalize the new vectors ( i.e., (ΔF t ji ) ) to get the cooperation parameter set (CP ).
The matrix W is updated by adding each column i in the matrix to the result of multiplying that column with corresponding vector CP i ∈ CP .
The final step before generating the counteroffer is to calculate the new local reservation values by multiplying the global reservation value of an issue by its new weight. Finally, the buyer agents chooses its preferred method to generate its counteroffers.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Our experiments investigate the scenario shown in Figure  1 where a buyer agent seeks to procure multiple services and each service has multiple issues while there is only one provider per service. The objective is to have an agreement over each service. If the buyer agent fails to have an agreement over any service, then the negotiation process fails.
In our experiments, we use the time-dependent tactics mechanism [4] to generate offers without doing any adaptation to the amount of generated offers or concession values.
The negotiation environments are described as follows. 1) Time-dependent tactics: All agents select a β value for the concession function (α(t) = (min(t, t a max )/t a max ) 1/β ) from the same distribution, β ∈ [0.04, 10] where t a max is the deadline of an agent a. The range of β covers a wide range of possible concession trends (see Figure 2) , for example the behavior of an agent can be described as Boulware where β < 1, linear where β value is around 1 and conceder where β > 1. Figure 2 shows the concession curve patterns for different β values. The deadline in Figure 2 is 20 rounds. 
A. Experimental hypotheses
To evaluate our proposed dynamic negotiation strategy DS, we use the method of exploratory studies [2] and propose several hypotheses which will be either supported or negated by the experimental results.
The dependent variables are the utility of the last agreements and the number of agreements, while the independent variables are the negotiation deadlines and the convexity degree of the concession curve.
The results are averaged and the Mann-Whitney test [7] is used to ensure that the differences between the results are statistically significant at 95% confidence level in most cases.
Hypothesis 1. The length of the deadline is an irrelevant factor for the DS strategy to outperform the static strategy.
Hypothesis 1 states that the DS strategy outperforms the static strategy under various negotiation deadline lengths.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between the buyer's deadline and the sellers' deadlines is an irrelevant factor for the DS strategy to outperform the static strategy.
Hypothesis 2 states that whether the buyer's deadline is the same, shorter or longer than the sellers' deadlines will not be a factor to detriment the performance of our dynamic strategy when compared to the static strategy.
Hypothesis 3. The convexity degree of the buyer's concession curve determined by the parameter β is an irrelevant factor for the DS strategy to outperform the static strategy in terms of utility gain.
Hypothesis 3 affirms that the DS mechanism outperforms the static strategy in case of considering various convexity degrees for the buyer agent.
B. Results and Discussions
This section shows the experimental results for the above hypotheses and discusses the results. We test the strategies of the buyer agent (i.e., the DS strategy and the static strategy) against seller agents using time-dependent tactics to generate their offers. Figure 3 shows that the DS strategy outperforms the static strategy in terms of utility gain under various deadline lengths (i.e., rounds.) For each deadline, we run the experiment 1000 times, then the results are averaged. We note that the proposed dynamic strategy is not efficient under very short deadlines because it requires certain number of negotiation rounds to adapt itself to the behaviors of the opponents. Hypothesis 2. We run the experiment 1000 times against each type of strategy. For example, we run the experiment 1000 times for the case when all agents have the same deadline, then we average the results etc. Table  VI shows the results for all possible cases of the buyer's deadlines in comparison with the seller agents' deadlines.
The results in the Table VI support hypothesis 2. We note that whether the buyer's deadline is equal, shorter or longer than its opponents will have no effect on the fact that the DS mechanism outperforms the static strategy especially in terms of utility outcome. Regarding the agreement rate, the results show that the DS performs equal or better than the static strategy. When the deadline is equal for all agents, then there is 100% agreement rate and that is because when the agents have equal deadlines, they will offer their reservation values at their deadlines and if there is some overlap between their reservation values, they will definitely reach an agreement.
Hypothesis 3. Figure 4 shows the results concerning hypothesis 3. The DS mechanism outperforms the static strategy in a wide range of different convexity degrees for the concession curve of the buyer agent. In each iteration, all agents select a random deadline from the same interval [30, 50] . We note that when the β increases, the average utility for the buyer agent using any strategy decreases since the buyer agent starts offering large concessions with higher β values. In any case the DS performs better under any β value. For each β, we the run the experiment 1000 times, then average the results. The first explicit architecture for the one-to-many negotiation form was presented in [15] where the buyer agent consists of sub-negotiators and a coordinator. The study proposes four different coordination strategies during concurrent multiple bilateral negotiation: (1) the desperate strategy in which the buyer agent accepts the first agreement and quits negotiations with all other sellers, (2) the patient strategy where the buyer agent makes temporary agreements with the seller agents during negotiation and holds on to these agreements until all the remaining threads of negotiations are finished, then the buyer agent selects the agreement with the highest utility, (3) the optimized patient which is similar to the patient strategy except that it does not accept a new agreement with less utility than the highest existing one, (4) finally, the manipulation strategies in which the coordinator changes the negotiation strategies of its subnegotiators during negotiation. Our approach addresses the problem of adjusting the local reservation values of the common issues at each negotiation round.
Several studies were published to address some aspects of the one-to-many negotiation form [8] [10][12] [15] . Most published works focus on the situation where agents negotiate over a single quality of service issue (e.g., price) for the purpose of securing one agreement, while this paper investigates the problem of one-to-many negotiation over objects with multiple issues for the purpose of securing multiple agreements. Our work is similar to some existing work, e.g. [14] [13], in terms of choosing the coordination approach that changes the negotiation strategy during negotiation. For example, a decision making technique for changing the negotiation strategies during negotiation depending on historic information of previous negotiations regarding of the agreement rate and the utility rate is proposed in [14] . Our approach investigates the multi-object/multi-issue negotiation domain and is based on the progress of the current negotiation encounter and does not rely on historic information.
Some heuristic methods were proposed to estimate the expected utility in both synchronized multi-threaded negotiations and dynamic multi-threaded negotiations [3] . The synchronized multi-threaded negotiations model considers the existing outside options for each single thread, while the dynamic multi-threaded negotiations model considers also the uncertain outside options that might arrive in the future. In both cases, the methods assume a knowledge of the probability distribution over the reservation prices of the opponents. In many cases, this kind of information is not available. Other works in the literature considered negotiation over multiple issues [5] [17], while the focus was mainly on bilateral encounters over a single object with multiple issues.
The above related work considers the one-to-many negotiation form where agents negotiate over a single object/single issue seeking a single agreement, while our work investigates negotiations for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements and each agreement means agreement over an object having several issues. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the one-to-many negoti-ation form where agents exchange offers and counteroffers over multiple objects with multiple issues concurrently.
VII. CONCLUSION
We investigate the automated negotiation approach for provisioning/procuring of services in the service oriented domain. Negotiation allows opponents to search a large space of service configurations (i.e., different levels of quality of service configurations) and directs the search to meet their needs through the exchanged offers/counteroffers during the negotiation process.
Our work demonstrates the fact that an agent is able to take advantage of negotiating with multiple opponents concurrently over multiple services, given that each service has multiple issues, taking into consideration the different behaviors of the opponents as a tool for dynamic management of the local reservation values for the common issues.
We consider a setting where a buyer agent negotiates with multiple independent sellers concurrently for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements.
We propose a novel dynamic negotiation strategy for multiple objects given that each object has multiple issues and a single provider (DNS-MMS, for short DS) that adjusts the local reservation value weights for the common issues at the start of each negotiation round. The DS involves few steps that produce (possibly) new values for the weights in the matrix W. The buyer agent applies the DS algorithm at each negotiation round. We compare our new strategy with a static strategy that keeps the local reservation values for the negotiation issues unchanged during negotiation. The results show that our proposed strategy is more effective and at the same time is a robust one since it produces good output under different negotiation environments.
We need to extend our work to include a situation where the buyer agent aims to procure multiple objects given that each object has multiple providers. We also need to adapt the amount of concessions at each negotiation round so that it reflects the current situation of the opponents.
